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Abstract 
The paper shows that conflicts of interest in science undermine its ethos. Some 
examples of this phenomenon have been analysed from the point of view of its 
destructive consequences. The need to counter them has also been identified in our 
country and some legal regulations and self-regulation are gradually being intro-
duced. However, they are not always respected in practice. In the last part of the 
paper, a model of management of risk of bias in scientific research has been out-
lined. The main thesis says that an awareness of conflict of interest embracing 
both knowledge of the general issues and relevant assessment of the personal risk 
of lack of objectivism should be an ethical minimum of every scientific worker. 
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1. Introduction 
Conflicts of interest have always been present in science, but its progressive 
commercialization and accompanying process of transforming knowledge into 
a value that is supposed to bring profits significantly increased their number, range 
                                                          
* The article is an updated version of the paper published in Polish in the Annales. Ethics in Economic 
Life, 20(1), 7–16. 
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and power of influence. More and more research is financed by industry, which 
directs funds for such issues which bring earning, and is interested in specific, 
meaning beneficial, research results. This leads to the question of the ethos of 
science along with its basic values of selflessness and objectivity.  
Conflict of interest in science may be a source of tendentiousness and ulti-
mately lead to serious distortions of research results. It strikes at the internal cohe-
sion and integrity of science because when we conduct scientific research or use 
their results, we are still basing on the testimony of others, that is, we should have 
trust in it (Grabski, 2009). Science is not a question of faith, but the average per-
son has to be based on faith in the results of scientific research because he or she 
is unable to control them. Distorted or even false results of such research under-
mine the faith-dignity of science and weaken the trust which society has for it, and 
thus may provide to weaken the support for it. Although it is not possible to com-
pletely eliminate the conflict of interest from science, as well as from other areas 
of human action, attempts are made to limit its negative effects.  
The article focuses on presenting the essence of conflict of interest in science, 
showing some examples of this phenomenon along with its destructive conse-
quences, and outlining the model of managing the risk of bias in scientific re-
search. The main aim of the work is to present arguments in favour of the postu-
late that awareness of conflict of interest, consisting of the general knowledge 
covering this issue and an accurate assessment of one’s location in the face of the 
threat of lack of objectivity, should be the ethical minimum of every researcher. 
2. Conflict of interest in science  
The concept of conflicts of interest is broad and includes various types of con-
flicts, therefore to avoid misunderstandings, it should be noted that situations in 
which two or more separate entities strive to achieve the same goal are beyond the 
scope of our considerations. So it’s not about the situation in which, for example, 
two companies that produce similar products want to acquire the same client 
or two scientific units apply for the same research grant. These types of conflicts 
are an immanent feature of the market game and in certain circumstances may 
favour economic order. There are conflicts that are particularly destructive to this 
order, and also to the social order, and these are the subject of our attention. It is 
a situation in which one entity is for some reason induced to act in incompatible 
directions. A conflict of interest occurs when a person (or organization) is obliged 
to double loyalty, in other words—when his or her interest (his or her own or the 
interest of the entity to which he or she has obligations) is not, or cannot be recon-
ciled with interest of another entity, who should also be loyal (Lewicka-
Strzałecka, 2012). This dual loyalty, or conflict of interest in science, manifests 
itself in a situation in which “financial considerations, or other personal benefits, 
may disrupt or give the impression that they disrupt the professional judgment of 
a given person in the approach to scientific research” (Krimsky, 2006, p. 197). 
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An example of such a conflict of interests is the situation of a Professor X, 
who gets to review the doctoral dissertation written by his cousin’s son. On the 
one hand, as a reliable judge, he or she should follow the norm of independence, 
that is, try to present an objective opinion. On the other hand, a strong social 
norm, present (not only) in our culture, requires him to act for his relative, that is, 
to make a positive review, and above all—with a positive conclusion. If a relative 
has written a good dissertation—which can happen—then Professor X will act in 
harmony with both duties. However, if the relative’s paper does not meet the re-
quired standards, then evaluating it positively he or she misappropriates scientific 
values, otherwise, he or she exposes himself or herself to family reluctance. This 
example shows that being in a conflict of interest does not have to, but can lead to 
disloyalty. 
A person (or organization) may be in a situation of conflict of interest due to 
external circumstances or as a result of their own actions. This first option applies 
to Professor “X”, to whom external institutions sent the work for review, while if 
the scientific unit accepts financial support from a company whose impact on the 
natural environment is to assess, it puts itself in a situation of conflict of interest at 
its own request. The interest may be financial or non-financial. If the researcher is 
to evaluate the effectiveness of the drug produced by the company in which he or 
she owns stock, then his interest is of a financial nature. However, the interest of 
Professor X to write a review of a relative’s dissertation is to maintain positive 
relationships with the family and is not of a financial nature. 
3. Funding effect 
Financial conflict of interest in science is easier to identify, due to the measurabil-
ity of the financial interest, has become the subject of numerous analyzes. Most of 
these point to the differences between the research results financed by private and 
public funds, in which the former generally interact with the interests of the spon-
sor (Bekelman, Li & Gross, 2003). This phenomenon is referred to as the funding 
bias (funding effect) and is accompanied by the hypothesis of biased conducted 
research (Krimsky, 2006). Funding bias has shown to be probable, among others, 
in research into the impact of smoking on human cognitive abilities (Turner 
& Spilich, 1997, pp. 1423–1426), the impact of passive smoking on health (Barnes 
& Bero, 1998, pp. 1566–1570) and the impact of plastic packaging made with 
bisphenol A (BPA) on stored food (vom Saal, Nagel, Timms & Welshons, 2005). 
Research on conflicts of interest in science allows to identifying numerous 
examples of the potential effects of this phenomenon, which turned out to be de-
structive on an individual and social level. These examples come from areas such 
as the tobacco industry, product safety, environmental protection, toxic fumes, 
efficacy and side effects of drugs, climate change, economics and finances. Al-
though it is impossible to prove a cause-and-effect relationship between the per-
sonal benefit of researchers or the interest of the enterprise sponsoring a given 
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study and its result, the funding bias is more and more confirmed in the statistical 
sense. There is no certainty, but there is a high probability that the one who pays 
has a decisive influence on the research results. This universal mechanism is illus-
trated by the two following examples of scientific papers with far-reaching conse-
quences. 
The first example comes from the area of medicine, where a conflict of interest 
has been noticed long ago. Published in 1966, the bestseller Feminine Forever 
helped convince many doctors and millions of their patients that estrogen postmeno-
pausal therapy is not only helpful but indispensable for women to function normally. 
The author of this book, the American gynaecologist, Dr. Robert A. Wilson (1966) 
maintained that menopause is not a natural condition but a disease that must be 
combated with hormone replacement therapy, and he has significantly contributed 
to the popularization of this thesis among American women. However, long-term 
studies on this therapy published in the Journal of the American Medical Associa-
tion in 2002 showed that its negative sides, in particular, the risks associated with 
cancer, outweigh the benefits. After many years, as a result of the journalistic 
investigation, it also turned out that Wilson’s book and its broad promotion were 
financed by the pharmaceutical company Wyeth, the drug producer (Writing 
Group for the WHI Investigators, 2002). 
The second example comes from the area of academic economics, which is 
the field of science in which the risk of conflicts of interest began to be noticed 
relatively recently. It concerns Iceland, which at the beginning of this century is 
considered a peaceful, prosperous and democratic country, well-developed eco-
nomically, enjoying a low level of corruption. When voices of concern about the 
excessive debt of privatized banks began to penetrate the public, the Icelandic 
Chamber of Commerce and international corporations commissioned a report on 
the financial system of Iceland. The main author of this study was Frederic Mish-
kin, a professor at Columbia Business School. The report showed that the banks 
are competently managed, financial supervision is working well and Iceland is 
a great place to invest. At the end of 2008, there was a nationwide crash, the three 
largest banks collapsed because they borrowed $ 120 billion—more than 10 times 
the Iceland’s GDP. It turned out that an apologetic study on the subject of the 
financial system, aimed at stopping the voices of public anxiety and lulling its 
vigilance, was not reliable. Preparing it, Mishkin based on official data provided 
by the Chamber of Commerce, that is, the institution whose appropriateness of 
functioning was to be verified. A controlled institution was paying a considerable 
fee ($124,000) for its own control. This fact was not disclosed in the report’s pub-
lication.  
Conflict of interest in the field of medical science has been recognized much 
earlier and better than in economics, and although it may still be a source of irreg-
ularities, awareness of its possible consequences, both among researchers and the 
public leads to counteracting them through legal regulations and self-regulation. 
However, representative involvement in the area of academic economy as a con-
flict of interest was not noticed for a long time. It is supposed that this entangle-
ment was one of the reasons that economists did not foresee the financial crisis of 
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2008. Analysis of the activity of nineteen prominent economists affiliated with 
prestigious universities showed that almost everyone was in various ways con-
nected with financial institutions (Carrick-Hagenbarth & Epstein, 2012). How-
ever, they did not disclose these connections when, as experts, they participated in 
the debate on the shape of reforms of the financial system and significantly influ-
enced the decisions about its deregulation, and the power of this influence was 
supported by the high authority of their academic positions. 
4. Legal and environmental regulations and their 
implementation in practice 
Problems regarding conflicts of interest in science have begun to be noticed in our 
country. Certain situations are regulated by law, for example, the Act on Degrees 
and the Academic Title amended in 2014 states that a reviewer of a doctoral dis-
sertation cannot be a person employed in the facility where the procedure is taking 
place.
1
 Another example of such a regulation is the prohibition of professional 
dependence introduced in 2011 between related academic employees.
2
 Its purpose 
is to counteract favouritism of family members based on non-substantive consid-
erations, hindering the implementation of academic careers from outside people 
and, consequently, hampering the development of science. However, it turns out 
that in some cases, scientific institutions have trouble interpreting and enforcing 
this ban; sometimes they manage to get around it.  
At the same time, many situations are beyond the reach of rigid legislation. 
Their solutions can be sought in the so-called soft law, that is, the collection of 
good practices, ethical codes, and internal regulations. The Ethics Code of a Re-
searcher adopted by the General Assembly of the Polish Academy of Science on 
lists independence (from external influence on conducting research, both on com-
missioning studies or expert opinions, as well as from influences from political, 
ideological or business pressure groups) as one of the universal ethical values in 
scientific work. Avoiding conflict of interest has been recognized as one of the 
good practices in this document, it is recommended to reveal potential conflicts of 
interest by authors of published works (3.3.9), and the refusal to review a work 
or give opinion on a project in a situation of conflict of interest (3.4.2), without 
                                                          
1 The Act of 14 March 2003 regarding academic degrees and academic title and about degrees and title 
in the field of art claims: “At least two reviewers are appointed in the doctoral conducts from among 
persons employed in a higher education institution or an organizational unit other than the one whose 
employee is a person applying for the award of a doctoral degree and other than members of the board 
of an organizational unit conducting a procedure.” 
2 Art. 118.7 of the Act of 27 July 2005 the law on higher education proclaim: “Between the academic 
teacher and those employed in the same university, his spouse, relatives or family members up to and 
including the second degree and a person remaining in the relationship of adoption, person’s care or 
guardianship cannot arise the relation of direct subordination. This does not apply to persons who 
perform the functions of single-person university institution, for whom the act provides vocation 
through elections.” 
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specifying what the conflict may involve. In other regulations, the conflict of 
interest situation is presented in more detail. In the document Best Practices in 
Review Procedures published in 2011 by the Ministry of Science and Higher Edu-
cation, it is stated that conflicts of interest may occur due to various links between 
the author of a work, project or other types of document and a reviewer. They can 
be of a family, social and professional nature, especially in the context of coopera-
tion, business dependency, the ability to decide on matters that are important to 
the reviewer, they can be both positive and negative ties. Conflict of interest is 
also caused by the situation of close links, especially financial links between the 
contracting entity and the reviewer. In the case of reviewing the activities of scien-
tific units, the reviewer should neither be carrying out a contract of employment or 
other long-term cooperation with the reviewer or be associated with it earlier. In 
a more categorical form, such a code is included in the Code of Ethics of the 
Polish Accreditation Committee prohibiting undertaking activities evaluating 
a given university for a member (expert) of PAC, if he or she (or a close relative) 
is or was employed or with whom he or she is connected by any civil law agree-
ments unless the period of 5 years has elapsed. He or she is also not allowed to 
take such actions towards a university whose headquarters, branch, or a non-local 
teaching centre is located in the same place where the headquarters of the univer-
sity employing a member (expert) of PAC or a close person is located. 
In practice, the standards of expert independence are not always perceived. 
During the inspection of the Supreme Audit Office at the Ministry of Science and 
Higher Education, it was stated, that 21 teams (75%) of the Science Council in-
cluded persons who are employees of scientific units assessed by a given team 
(including one-person teams). The situation in which the evaluators are assessed 
could adversely affect the course of parameterization work and the objectivity of 
the assessment. It turns out that the independence of experts is not guaranteed by 
declarations of impartiality and no conflict of interests signed by members of the 
opinion-making and advisory teams joining the evaluation of applications for 
funding for science (Supreme Audit Office, 2011). 
An example of the lack of awareness of the essence of the conflict of interests 
in managing the organization of scientific competitions is a request to prepare 
a review of the grant application addressed to the researcher who applied for funds 
in the same competition (Jaskułowski, 2013). The organizers tried to dispel the 
ethical doubts indicated by the potential reviewer, stating that a conflict of interest 
occurs when there are business relationships between the reviewer, the applicant, 
and the project manager (e.g. the same workplace, business subordination) or the 
reviewer is participating in the implementation of the project for which a review is 
requested. They did not notice that the reviewer assessing his competitors has an 
interest in lowering the value of their research intentions, which may affect the 
lack of objectivity of his assessment. Proposing a man to influence the positioning 
of other people applying for funds from a limited pool of money, for which he or 
she also tries to apply, means that he or she may be, indirectly, but nevertheless, 
a judge in his or her own case. Resisting this temptation can lead to a reduction in 
his or her own chances in this competition. 
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5. Conflict of interest management: The three A model 
An important role in limiting the negative effects of conflicts of interest is played 
by self-regulation referring to higher values on the one hand and disciplinary sanc-
tions on the other. Self-regulation is particularly well developed in the sphere of 
economics because now every major company that cares about success has a poli-
cy of managing conflicts of interest. In many cases, it involves making employee 
requirements more restrictive than the law and enforcing them in a specific way. 
The management of conflicts of interest is based on three pillars: awareness, 
avoidance, avowal. This type of management—the three A model, can also be 
used in science. 
Its first pillar, or awareness-raising, consists of providing employees with the 
ability to identify a conflict of interest in the specific conditions of the organiza-
tion’s functioning and determining the risks associated with it. The risk is associ-
ated not only with the actual damage that a conflict of interest may cause but also 
with potential losses caused by straining the image. In science, this image strain 
turns into a suspicion of bias that can destroy social faith in the results of scientific 
research. An important postulate is not only to avoid bias, but also to not be sus-
pected of bias. Building this pillar is extremely difficult in the scientific communi-
ty because, as noted by the eminent expert and investigator of conflicts of interest, 
Sheldon Krimsky, “a typical scientist does not acknowledge that any personal 
financial interest related to the subject of his research could affect his approach to 
research” (2006, p. 198). Researchers are usually convinced of their impartiality 
and treat all suspicions about its lack as unfounded. 
Another pillar is the avoidance of certain activities, for example, some organ-
izations prohibit their employees from trading with their parent company, compet-
itive activities, and many others. Some scientific institutions do not allow re-
searchers to participate in projects the results of which could cause them financial 
gain. Avoiding a conflict of interest may also manifest itself in preventing some 
risky connections, such as selecting reviewers. It may involve self-selection, that 
is, potential judges themselves declare their impartiality. In the situation of a large 
number of texts, papers that need to be reviewed, computer methods of analyzing 
potential connections are used, for example, the similarity of Internet addresses or 
affiliations is being studied. Another way is to set up a group of co-authors so that 
the text does not go to a review to someone who has worked with the author in the 
past. In order to determine the level of conflict of interests, the analysis of connec-
tions on social forums is used, and so profiles of scientists in which they reveal 
their connections with other researchers are examined. 
The third pillar of the conflict of interest management model is avowal. This 
is postulated when the prohibition of avoidance is unfavourable, or difficult to 
implement. Avowal greatly limits potential abuses because knowing that a per-
son’s connections are known to the public stops them from acting in their favour 
at the expense of the public interest. The disclosure should be made by the person 
affected by the conflict. In some organizations, it is routine and is treated as an 
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employee’s obligation, and the degree of threat of conflict of interest is assessed 
by persons at subsequent levels of the service hierarchy. In the case of people 
holding top positions in the company, this degree should be evaluated by ethics 
managers.  
The avowal may be internal or external. The first consists of informing supe-
riors, or possibly colleagues in the organization, about the conflict of interests. 
However, in certain situations this proves to be insufficient and external disclo-
sure, i.e. to inform about the conflict of interest of public opinion, is advisable. 
Such disclosure from the authorities of the University of Toronto medical depart-
ment has been demanded by students concerned about the scope of indoctrination-
controlled by pharmaceutical companies. Currently, before the lecture, each lec-
turer must make a statement about potential conflicts of interest in which he or she 
found himself or herself, such as shares, fees, consultations, membership in super-
visory boards. Previously, this statement was known only to the university  
authorities, currently all students participating in the lectures have the right to 
know them, in order to assess to what extent their content could have been influ-
enced by the lecturer’s involvement (Wiens & Cota, 2009, pp. 152–153).  
The policy of external disclosure is used more and more by scientific maga-
zines, especially biomedical journals. It has become the accepted practice that the 
author submitting an article to The Lancet, for example, discloses the sources of 
funding of his research, companies in which he has financial interest, and sponsors 
of his travels to conferences. Similar requirements are made by some Polish mag-
azines, especially the medical ones.
3
  
6. Conclusion 
The above examples and many others lead to the conclusion that conflicts of inter-
est undermine the selflessness of science, which is one of the pillars of its ethos, 
determining its identity. The selflessness of science, according to Robert Merton 
(1982), consists of the fact that, regardless of the motivations of individuals, scien-
tific activity is subordinated to seeking the truth, not to one or other particular 
goals. Scientists seek reliable knowledge for themselves, personal or social bene-
fits cannot be the driving force behind such searches. Selflessness is not a feature 
of scholars, but a norm forced institutionally through the requirement of an inter-
subjective control of results. All claims must be subject to substantive acceptance 
criteria, so they cannot be particularistic considerations—personal or social bene-
fits. Conflicts of interests in science contribute to the erosion of the institutional 
norm of selflessness, on which people base their trust in this component of social 
order. 
                                                          
3 In the case of medical journals, they result from the principles developed by the International Com-
mittee of Medical Journal Editors accepted by major periodicals. 
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